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THE HIGHEST COURT: A DIALOGUE BETWEEN
JUSTICE LOUIS BRANDEIS AND JUSTICE ANTONIN
SCALIA ON STARE DECISIS
P. Thomas DiStanislao III*
"I love judges, and I love courts. They are my ideals, that
typify on earth what we shall meet hereafter in heaven un-
der a just God."'
-Chief Justice William Howard Taft
The scene is the main reading room in the Supreme Court li-
brary. It is 12:01 AM on a Thursday night, and a hapless law
clerk' named Madison Nomos' is working on a draft of a dissent-
ing opinion for his Justice. Specifically, Nomos is researching
whether an earlier Supreme Court case-one with which his Jus-
tice vehemently disagrees-should play a significant role in the
Court's analysis of an issue that has gripped the nation. Nomos's
Justice was recently confirmed, and this will be her first oppor-
* Law Clerk to the Honorable Henry E. Hudson, United States District Court, East-
ern District of Virginia, Richmond, Virginia. J.D., 2016, University of Richmond School of
Law; B.A., 2011, Wake Forest University. Any views or opinions expressed herein are my
own. Thanks to Professor Kevin Walsh, Chris Keegan, Ann Reid, Chris Rohde, and An-
drew McGowan for their suggestions and ideas. I remain indebted to my father, Phil DiS-
tanislao, for his willingness to share his virtuosic ability to use sports metaphors to ex-
plain all aspects of life and the law. And as always, none of this would have been possible
without my wonderful wife, Elizabeth. Finally, I would like to thank Glenice Coombs, Ra-
chel Willer, and the University of Richmond Law Review staff members for their work ed-
iting this dialogue. Any remaining errors are my own.
1. Mason, William Howard Taft, in 3 THE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT 1789-
1978, at 2105 (Leon Friedman & Fred L. Israel eds., 1980).
2. See John Duffy, Tribute: Justice Scalia's Hapless Law Clerk, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar.
6, 2016, 11:31 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/03/tribute-justice-scalias-hapless-law-
clerk/ (describing a time when Justice Scalia, "ever the teacher," refused to allow a "false
lesson"' go unchallenged and, therefore, assigned a "hapless law clerk"-Professor Duffy-
the task of reviewing the lengthy legislative history of an Act to prove its lack of worth in
construing legal text).
3. The name is a combination of James Madison, the primary architect of the United
States Constitution, and Nomos, the ancient Greek daemon of laws, statutes, and ordi-
nances.
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tunity to firmly state her views on stare decisis4 in the Supreme
Court. She has tasked the clerk with providing support for her ar-
gument that the Court should abandon its prior ruling. Nomos
has been working on the opinion for hours and is no closer to
reaching a conclusion than when he started. Though the court-
house is empty, the clerk hears a noise as the doors at the end of
the room fling open. Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Louis
Brandeis enter the room, engaged in a heated argument over Web-
ster's New International Dictionary: Second Edition (1934).
MADISON NOMOS [startled]: Who's there? Do you have clearance
to be in the building after hours?
JUSTICE SCALIA: We don't need clearance!
JUSTICE BRANDEIS: The real question is, what are you doing here
so late? Normally we have the place to ourselves. No matter, let
me introduce myself; I am Justice Louis Brandeis.
JUSTICE SCALIA [placing the Dictionary on a nearby reading ta-
ble]: And "I'm Scalia."'
MADISON NOMOS [standing]: Well of course I know who you are. I
just... well, never mind. Forgive me for not greeting you proper-
ly. I am Madison Nomos. I have been working alone in here for
hours and thought that everyone had left.
4. See generally THE LAW OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENT (Bryan A. Garner et al. eds.,
2016). Stare decisis comes from the Latin phrase, "stare decisis et non quieta movere,"
which means "[t]o stand by things decided, and not to disturb settled points." Stare decisis,
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). Hence, "stare decisis" is defined as "[t]he doc-
trine of precedent, under which it is necessary for a court to follow earlier judicial deci-
sions when the same points arise again in litigation." Id. There are two types of stare deci-
sis frequently referred to by commentators: "vertical" and "horizontal." Vertical stare
decisis refers to the requirement that lower courts must follow higher courts. For example,
according to vertical stare decisis, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals must follow all de-
cisions made by the Supreme Court in the same way that the Eastern District of Virginia
must follow all decisions made by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. See Brown v. Allen,
344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("We are not final because we are infal-
lible, but we are infallible only because we are final."). Horizontal stare decisis is usually
defined as the requirement that a court must follow its own precedents. See Payne v. Ten-
nessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991) (noting that adherence to horizontal precedent is "the pre-
ferred course because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent develop-
ment of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual
and perceived integrity of the judicial process"). This dialogue is chiefly concerned with
horizontal stare decisis in the Supreme Court of the United States.
5. Bush v. Gore, OYEZ, https://www.oyez.org/cases/2000/00-949 (last visited Apr. 5,
2017) (said as a preemptive strike to assist a lawyer who had already called two Justices
by the wrong name earlier in his argument).
THE HIGHEST COURT
JUSTICE SCALIA [pulling up a chair]: Does your Justice have you
slaving away reviewing the long-forgotten legislative history of
some statute from the 1890s?
MADISON NOMOS [sitting down and laughing]: No, Justice Scalia.
The Court is preparing to release its opinion in a highly contested
and publicized case, and my Justice is writing a dissent. The ma-
jority is basing its conclusion on a case that was decided several
years ago that my Justice believes was decided incorrectly-
neither of you wrote the opinion. She has asked me to research
the Supreme Court's historical treatment of stare decisis to fur-
ther support her opinion. This is her first term on the Court, and
it will likely be her first decision of many where she faces the is-
sue, so she wants this opinion to be as well supported as possible
for future reference. And unfortunately, my research is turning
into a Sisyphean effort: the closer I get to a conclusion, the more I
feel as though the true answer is slipping away.
JUSTICE SCALIA: That seems like a daunting task for a law clerk:
summarize the last two-hundred years of stare decisis jurispru-
dence. "What happened to the Eighth Amendment['s]" proscrip-
tion of cruel and unusual punishment?6
JUSTICE BRANDEIS [pulling up a chair, intrigued]: Well, does the
case turn on statutory or constitutional interpretation?
MADISON NOMOS: On constitutional interpretation, Justice Bran-
deis. It centers on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Thirty years ago, the Court found that the Constitu-
tion afforded a right that did not have its basis in either its text
or the history or tradition of the United States. Nevertheless,
everybody-from the lower courts to the populace at large-seems
to have accepted it as the law of the land. Now the Court wants to
expand that right to include something that would have never
been considered in 1868. The majority rests its decision on the
past case, but my Justice believes that case should be overruled
and the Court should return to first principles.
JUSTICE BRANDEIS: Well, I believe that I answered your Justice's
question concerning the Court's historical treatment of constitu-
tional precedent back in 1932. The Court is not bound to follow
past precedent just because it has become accepted by the judici-
6. National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, OYEZ, https://www.oyez.
org/cases/2011/11-393 (last visited Apr. 5, 2017).
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ary and society. While, of course "[s]tare decisis is usually the
wise policy, because in most matters it is more important that the
applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right," it
"is not, like the rule of res judicata, a universal, inexorable com-
mand."7 In matters of statutory interpretation, for instance, the
Court should be deferential to stare decisis because correction can
be had, rather easily, by legislation.8 "But in cases involving the
Federal Constitution, where correction through legislative action
is practically impossible, this Court has often overruled its earlier
decisions."9 After all, the Court should bow "to the lessons of ex-
7. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 405-06 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dis-
senting).
8. Id. at 406. Still, Justice Brandeis cited a string of cases where the Court had over-
ruled precedent based on statutory interpretation because of the importance of the issue.
Though this analysis does not figure prominently into the dialogue, it does add some in-
sight into the discussion regarding Justice Brandeis's motives for asserting his dichotomy.
Therefore, for the convenience of the reader, the text of footnote 1 is included below:
This Court has, in matters deemed important, occasionally overruled its earli-
er decisions although correction might have been secured by legislation. See
Chicago & Eastern Illinois R. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 284 U.S. 296,
overruling Erie R. Co. v. Collins, 253 U.S. 77, and Erie R. Co. v. Szary, 253
U.S. 86; Gleason v. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co., 278 U.S. 349, 357, in part
overruling Friedlander v. Texas & Pacific Ry. Co., 130 U.S. 416; Lee v. Ches-
apeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 260 U.S. 653, 659, overruling Ex parte Wisner, 203
U.S. 449, and qualifying In re Moore, 209 U.S. 490; Boston Store v. American
Graphophone Co., 246 U.S. 8, 25, and Motion Picture Co. v. Universal Film
Co., 243 U.S. 502, 518, overruling Henry v. A. B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1; Rosen
v. United States, 245 U.S. 467, 470, overruling United States v. Reid, 12
How. 361 (compare Greer v. United States, 245 U.S. 559, 561; Jin Fuey Moy
v. United States, 254 U.S. 189, 195; Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,
466); Roberts v. Lewis, 153 U.S. 367, 377, overruling Giles v. Little, 104 U.S.
291; Kountze v. Omaha Hotel Co., 107 U.S. 378, 387, overruling Stafford v.
Union Bank of Louisiana, 16 How. 135; United States v. Phelps, 107 U.S.
320, 323, overruling Shelton v. The Collector, 5 Wall. 113, 118; Hornbuckle v.
Toombs, 18 Wall. 648, 652, 653, overruling Orchard v. Hughes, 1 Wall. 77,
Noonan v. Lee, 2 Black 499, and Dunphy v. Kleinsmith, 11 Wall. 610; Mason
v. Eldred, 6 Wall. 231, 238, in effect overruling Sheehy v. Mandeville, 6
Cranch 253; Gazzam v. Phillips' Lessee, 20 How. 372, 377, 378, overruling
Brown's Lessee v. Clements, 3 How. 650; Vidal v. Girard's Executors, 2 How.
127, qualifying Baptist Assn. v. Hart's Executor, 4 Wheat. 1; Gordon v. Og-
den, 3 Pet. 33, 34, overruling Wilson v. Daniel, 3 Dall. 401; compare Brenham
v. German American Bank, 144 U.S. 173, 187, overruling Rogers v. Burling-
ton, 3 Wall. 654 and Mitchell v. Burlingham, 4 Wall. 270; Hudson v. Guestier,
6 Cranch 281, 285, overruling Himely v. Rose, 4 Cranch 241, 284. See also
Fairfield v. County of Gallatin, 100 U.S. 47, 54, 55, and cases cited.
Id. at 406-07 n. 1 (emphasis added).
9. Id. at 406-07. This has come to be known as the "Brandeis Dichotomy," which con-
tends that this two-tiered standard was the historical practice of the Court. This paper
only addresses a limited aspect of horizontal stare decisis on the Supreme Court and, of
course, is not meant to be a treatise on the topic. For a comprehensive overview on the
subject, see THE LAW OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENT, supra note 4.
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perience and the force of better reasoning, recognizing that the
process of trial and error, so fruitful in the physical sciences, is
appropriate also in the judicial function."' Even Justice Scalia
would agree with that.
JUSTICE SCALIA: I agree with part of what you said, but certainly
not everything. On the whole, though, yes, "the doctrine of stare
decisis is less rigid in its application to constitutional precedents,"
and that is "especially true of a constitutional precedent that is
both recent and in apparent tension with other decisions.""
MADISON NOMOS: Yes, Justice Brandeis, I am familiar with your
influential dissent in Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co. But, with
all due respect, I worry about the historical roots of your two-
tiered standard in the Court's practice. And, therefore, I have
concerns about suggesting that my Justice rely on it.
JUSTICE BRANDEIS: What do you mean that you "worry about the
historical roots"? I cited twenty-nine cases in that dissent that ei-
ther overruled or qualified over thirty other cases concerning con-
stitutional interpretation. 2 Those cases clearly demonstrate that
10. Coronado Oil, 285 U.S. at 407-08.
11. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 965 (1991).
12. For the convenience of the reader and because of its importance to the forthcoming
conversation, the text of Justice Brandeis's footnotes is included below:
Besides cases in note 4, see East Ohio Gas Co. v. Tax Commission, 283 U.S.
465, 472, overruling Pennsylvania Gas Co. v. Public Service Commission, 252
U.S. 23; Terral v. Burke Construction Gas Co. 257 U.S. 529, 533, overruling
Doyle v. Continental Insurance Co., 94 U.S. 535, and Security Mutual Life
Insurance Co. v. Prewitt, 202 U.S. 246; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Towers, 245
U.S. 6, 17, in part overruling Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Ry. Co. v.
Smith, 173 U.S. 684; United States v. Nice, 241 U.S. 591, 601, overruling
Matter of Heff, 197 U.S. 488; Garland v. Washington, 232 U.S. 642, 646, 647,
overruling Crain v. United States, 162 U.S. 625; Pollock v. Farmers' Loan &
Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601, in effect overruling Hylton v. United States, 3 Dall.
171; Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100, 118, overruling Peirce v. New Hampshire,
5 How. 504; Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U.S. 640, 647, overruling Osborne
v. Mobile, 16 Wall. 479; Morgan v. United States, 113 U.S. 476, 496, overrul-
ing Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 700; Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 457, 553, over-
ruling Hepburn v. Griswold, 8 Wall. 603; The Belfast, 7 Wall. 624, 641, over-
ruling in part Allen v. Newberry, 21 How. 544; The Genesee Chief, 12 How.
443, 456, overruling The Thomas Jefferson, 10 Wheat. 428, and The Orleans
v. Phoebus, 11 Pet. 175; Louisville, Cincinnati & Charleston R. Co. v. Letson,
2 How. 497, 554-556, overruling Commercial & Rail Road Bank v. Slocomb,
14 Pet. 60, and other cases, and qualifying Bank of the United States v. De-
veaux, 5 Cranch 61; compare Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 16 How.
314, 325, 326, in turn qualifying the Letson case, supra. Compare Helson v.
Kentucky, 279 U.S. 245, 251, qualifying Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35;
Sonneborn Bros. v. Cureton, 262 U.S. 506, qualifying Texas Co. v. Brown, 258
U.S. 466; Browman v. Continental Oil Co., 256 U.S. 642, and Standard Oil
2017] 1153
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this two-tiered approach was the historical practice of the Court.
Moreover, the Court-including both its progressive and con-
servative members-has accepted this approach for nearly a cen-
tury. Chief Justice Rehnquist repeated the two-tiered standard
verbatim when he wrote that .'[s]tare decisis is not ... a univer-
sal, inexorable command,' especially in cases involving the inter-
pretation of the Federal Constitution."'3 He continued by noting
that "[e]rroneous decisions in such constitutional cases are
uniquely durable, because correction through legislative action,
Co. v. Graves, 249 U.S. 389; Union Tank Line Co. v. Wright, 249 U.S. 275,
283, 284, qualifying Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18;
Wheeler v. Sohmer, 233 U.S. 434, 440, qualifying Buck v. Beach, 206 U.S.
392 (compare Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U.S. 586); Home Telephone & Tele-
graph Co. v. Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278, 294, qualifying Barney v. New York,
193 U.S. 430; Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. Co. v. Texas, 210 U.S. 217, 226, quali-
fying Maine v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 142 U.S. 217; In re Chapman, 166 U.S.
661, 670, qualifying Runkle v. United States, 122 U.S. 543, 555; New Orleans
City & Lake R. Co. v. New Orleans, 143 U.S. 192, 195, qualifying Gordon v.
Tax Appeal Court, 3 How. 133; Philadelphia S. S. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122
U.S. 326, 342, qualifying State Tax on Railway Gross Receipts, 15 Wall. 284;
Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557, 568, 569, quali-
fying Peik v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co., 94 U.S. 164; Kilbourn v.
Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 196-200, qualifying Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat.
204. See also discussion of New York v. Miln, 11 Pet. 102, in Passenger Cas-
es, 7 How. 283; that of Fickeln v. Shelby County Taxing District, 145 U.S. 1,
in Crew Levick Co. v. Pennsylvania, 245 U.S. 292, 296, and in Texas
Transport & Terminal Co. v. New Orleans, 264 U.S. 150, 153, 154; that of
Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Texas, 204 U.S. 403, in Baltimore &
Ohio Southwestern R. Co. v. Settle, 260 U.S. 166, 173.
Movement in constitutional interpretation and application--often involving
no less striking departures from doctrines previously established-takes place
also without specific overruling or qualification of the earlier cases. Compare,
for example, Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, with The Slaughter House
Cases, 16 Wall. 36; Tyson v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, with Munn v. Illinois, 94
U.S. 113; Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, and Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S.
426, with Lochner v. New York, 178 U.S. 45.
Coronado Oil, 285 U.S. at 407-08 n.2.
See Alpha Cement Co. v. Massachusetts, 268 U.S. 203, 218, overruling Baltic
Mining Co. v. Massachusetts, 231 U.S. 68; Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Min-
nesota, 280 U.S. 204, 209, overruling Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U.S. 189. See
also Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U.S. 586, 591; Beidler v. South Carolina Tax
Commission, 282 U.S. 1, 8; First National Bank v. Maine, 284 U.S. 312. Dur-
ing the twenty-seven years preceding the decision of Farmers Loan & Trust
Co. v. Minnesota, Blackstone v. Miller had been cited with approval in this
Court fifteen times. Compare Educational Films Corp. v. Ward, 282 U.S. 379,
3920394, and Pacific Co. v. Johnson, decided today, post, p. 480, qualifying
Macallen Co. v. Massachusetts, 279 U.S. 620.
Id. at 409 n.4.
13. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 954-55
(1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (citing
Coronado Oil, 285 U.S. at 405 (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
[Vol. 51:11491154
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save for constitutional amendment, is impossible."'4 And Justice
O'Connor agreed that stare decisis "reflects a policy judgment
that 'in most matters it is more important that the applicable rule
of law be settled than that it be settled right.' . . . That policy is at
its weakest when we interpret the Constitution because our in-
terpretation can be altered only by constitutional amendment or
by overruling our prior decisions."'" Justice Breyer likewise found
that the "Court applies stare decisis more 'rigidly' in statutory
than in constitutional cases."'" In fact, since 1944,7 the Court has
uncritically adhered to that standard because, after all, it has
been its historical practice to do so. From Justice Stone," to Jus-
tice Frankfurter, 9 to even Justice Thomas," this two-tiered
standard is, unwaveringly, how the Supreme Court approaches
matters of stare decisis.
MADISON NOMOS: I am aware of your lengthy footnotes and the
cases that you cited in support of your standard. And it is clear
that the Court has accepted your two-tiered approach. But, it
seems to me that your standard has had a dramatic effect on the
Court-one that would not have occurred were it not for its ac-
ceptance. For example, as of 2004, the Supreme Court had over-
ruled its prior decisions approximately 225 times since its crea-
tion.21 In the first 143 years of the Court's existence-before your
14. Id. at 954-55.
15. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235 (1997) (citing Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Flori-
da, 517 U.S. 44, 63 (1996); Coronado Oil, 285 U.S. at 406 (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
16. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 923 (2007)
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
17. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
18. St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 94 (Stone, J. and
Cardozo, J., concurring) (citing Coronado Oil, 285 U.S. at 407, 408 (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing)) ('CThe doctrine of stare decisis... has only a limited application in the field of consti-
tutional law.").
19. Graves v. New York, 306 U.S. 466, 491-92 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (Although
"[j]udicial exegesis is unavoidable with reference to an organic act like our Constitution,
[nevertheless] the ultimate touchstone of constitutionality is the Constitution itself and
not what we have said about it.").
20. Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 401-02 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("It is true
that we give stronger stare decisis effect to our holdings in statutory cases than in consti-
tutional cases.").
21. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION, S. Doc. NO. 108-19, at 63 (Supp. 2004); CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION,
S. Doc. NO. 108-17, at 2385-99 (2002). Much of Nomos's critique of the Brandeis Dichot-
omy, including the proceeding figures, is based on Lee J. Strang & Bryce G. Poole, The
Historical (In)Accuracy of the Brandeis Dichotomy: An Assessment of the Two-Tiered
Standard of Stare Decisis for Supreme Court Precedents, 86 N.C. L. REV. 969, 979-80
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dissent in Coronado Oil-the Court only overruled its own prece-
dents forty-one times, or roughly once every three-and-a-half
years.22 But in the seventy-four years since your articulation of
the two-tiered standard, the Court overruled its own precedents
184 times, which, on average, is about two-and-a-half times per
year. 8 Given such a large disparity, does it not follow that your
approach changed the trajectory of the Court's approach to stare
decisis instead of solidifying it?
JUSTICE SCALIA [skeptically]: I seriously doubt that Justice
Brandeis's approach is the sole cause of the increase in overruling
precedents on the Supreme Court. After all, "Supreme Court Jus-
tices do not create law in a vacuum."'2 4 There was simply less need
to overrule precedent during the Court's first 143 years of exist-
ence because of the country's ability to more easily remedy incor-
rect decisions pertaining to the Constitution than it has now.25 If
the Court did not take an approach to stare decisis where it was
more flexible in cases pertaining to constitutional interpretation,
the populace would be bound to the will of five unelected judges
with little hope to reverse them. That hardly sounds like a demo-
cratic republic to me ....
MADISON NOMOS: Well, Justice Scalia, I suppose that you are
right. Certainly there were factors in addition to the acceptance of
Justice Brandeis's dichotomy that played a role in the increased
rate of reversals.26 But what troubles me-and most likely my
Justice-the most about the two-tiered standard is the unques-
tioned notion that its purported origin is in the Court's nine-
teenth century's practice.
(2008).
22. See supra note 21.
23. See supra note 21.
24. Strang & Poole, supra note 21, at 980.
25. See, e.g., Pollock v. Farmers Loan and Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895) (overruled by
the Sixteenth Amendment); Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856) (overruled by the
Fourteenth Amendment); Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1793) (overruled by the ratifi-
cation of the Eleventh Amendment in 1795); see also Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, THE KALB REPORT (Apr. 17, 2014), https://research.gwu.edu/sites
/research.gwu.edu/files/downloads/45Words Transcript.pdf ("[I1f there were a targeted
amendment that were adopted by the states, I think the only provision I would amend is
the Amendment Provision. I figured out, at one time, what percentage of the populace
could prevent an Amendment to the Constitution. And, if you take a bare majority in the
smallest states by population, I think something less than two percent of the people can
prevent a Constitutional Amendment. It ought to be hard, but it shouldn't be that hard.").
26. Strang & Poole, supra note 21, at 980 n.44.
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JUSTICE BRANDEIS: Were the cases not sufficient to support that
assertion?
MADISON NOMOS: Justice Brandeis, the cases that you cited are of
particular concern to me. As part of my research, I came across
an article suggesting that, despite the fact that you cited numer-
ous cases to support the claim that this two-tiered approach was
the historic practice of the Court, none of them actually supported
that position.27 The paper argued that, at most, there were a
handful of isolated arguments in those opinions by individual
Justices where they "distinguished their approach to constitu-
,,28tional cases from cases involving other subject matters. But
even still, none of those sufficiently supported your dichotomy as
the historical practice of the Court.29
JUSTICE BRANDEIS [indignantly]: Well, please tell me why exactly
those cases are insufficient to support the historical record? And,
while Law Review articles can certainly be of great assistance in
reaching a judicial determination," let's talk about the actual
cases, if you don't mind.
MADISON NOMOS: Of course, Justice Brandeis. The first case of
concern to me is Chief Justice Taney's dissenting opinion in the
Passenger Cases,3' which you cited in footnote 2 of your dissent in
Coronado Oil.32 As you are aware, the Passenger Cases pertained
to whether state statutes that taxed aliens upon arrival to the
states violated the Commerce Clause.33 In that case, a splintered
Court found that states did not have the right to impose a tax de-
termined by the number of passengers of a designated category
27. Id. at 991.
28. Id.
29. See generally id. at 991-1014.
30. STEPHEN W. BASKERVILLE, OF LAWS AND LIMITATIONS: AN INTELLECTUAL
PORTRAIT OF LOUIS DEMBITZ BRANDEIS 267-68 (1994) ("Beginning with his very first dis-
senting opinion in Adams v. Tanner (1917), the new justice had adopted the practice of
supporting his juristic assaults on what he considered the narrow legalism of the Court's
conservatives with copious references to law reviews, academic texts, and other non-
judicial sources. In fact, the technique used in these "Brandeis opinions" was similar to
that developed in the celebrated "Brandeis briefs" that he had filed in Muller v. Oregon
and a number of subsequent social-welfare cases.').
31. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 494 (1849) (Taney, C.J., dissenting). This exchange concern-
ing the Passenger Cases is based off of the analysis in Strang & Poole, supra note 21, at
994-98.
32. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 407-08 n.2 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
33. Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 283.
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on board a ship and/or disembarking into the State.34 In his dis-
sent, Chief Justice Taney argued that the Court's "opinion upon
the construction of the Constitution is always open to discussion
when it is supposed to have been founded in error, and that its
judicial authority should hereafter depend altogether on the force
of the reasoning by which it is supported. 35 I assume that this is
what you cited in support of your assertion that it was the histor-
ic practice of the Court to give less precedential weight to matters
of constitutional interpretation. But Chief Justice Taney's state-
ment was preceded by his recognition of the authority of constitu-
tional precedent: "After such opinions [in the License Cases], judi-
cially delivered, I had supposed that question to be settled, so far
as any question upon the construction of the Constitution ought
to be regarded as closed by the decision of this court., 36 Further,
Chief Justice Taney "conceded that Supreme Court precedent in
constitutional matters would act as authority; they only could not
absolutely foreclose reopening an issue., 37 Throughout the rest of
his opinion, Chief Justice Taney cited, discussed, and treated as
authoritative the Court's precedent in a number of cases involv-
ing constitutional precedent." For example, Chief Justice Taney
argued that City of New York v. Miln" and Brown v. Maryland"
had already decided the questions presented in the Passenger
Cases."' Subsequently, he summarized his argument: 'With such
authorities to support me, so clearly and explicitly stating the
doctrine, it cannot be necessary to pursue the argument fur-
ther." 2 Moreover, in a later opinion, Chief Justice Taney noted
that "stare decisis is the safe and established rule of judicial poli-
cy, and should always be adhered to. For if the law, as pro-
nounced by the court, ought not to stand, it is in the power of the
legislature to amend it, without impairing rights acquired under
it."" It does not follow to me that he would have recognized the
34. See id.
35. Id. at 470 (Taney, C.J., dissenting).
36. Id.
37. Strang & Poole, supra note 21, at 995 (emphasis added).
38. Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 471-94 (Taney, C.J., dissenting).
39. 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102 (1837).
40. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827).
41. See Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 477 (Taney, C.J., dissenting); see also id.
at 479 (" I assent fully to the doctrine upon that subject laid down in the case of Gibbons v.
Ogden.").
42. Id. at 480.
43. The Genesee Chief, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443, 458 (1851).
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importance of precedent in a later decision while arguing that
stare decisis did not apply as strongly to constitutional precedent
in an earlier opinion-especially if, as you argue, the earlier opin-
ion represented the historical practice of the Court. And several
years later, in Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., the
Court relied on the standard rule for stare decisis-not your di-
chotomy or on those elements of Chief Justice Taney's dissent
that support it-in ruling that a corporation is a citizen, for the
purposes of federal diversity jurisdiction, in the state of its incor-
poration.44 Does this not, at a minimum, cut away at the historical
record you presented in your Coronado Oil dissent?
JUSTICE BRANDEIS: Well, I think that you are mischaracterizing
those opinions. Nevertheless, even if I conceded that you were
correct with regards to the Passenger Cases, there are still more
than two dozen other citations that support my position.
MADISON NOMOS: Yes, your honor. There was one majority opin-
ion, in particular, that appeared to have a plausible bearing on
your claim that constitutional decisions should be accorded less
precedential weight than other precedents: the Legal Tender Cas-
es, 45 which you also cited in footnote 2 of your dissent in Coronado
Oil." As you know, the central issues of the Legal Tender Cases
were whether Congress had the authority to print paper money
and whether paper money could be used to settle debts incurred
before the Legal Tender Act was passed. 7 In 1870, the Court held
in Hepburn v. Griswold that the Legal Tender Act was unconsti-
tutional as applied retroactively to contracts entered into before
its passage.4 8 Hepburn was decided with less than a full bench,
and that is why, in 1871, the Court heard two more cases reargu-
ing the constitutionality of the Act, after two vacancies had been
filled. 9 And so, in the Legal Tender Cases, the Court, by a vote of
five to four, overruled Hepburn and held that the Legal Tender
44. See Marshall v. Bait. & Ohio R.R. Co., 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314 (1853).
45. 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1871). The following discussion draws on Strang & Poole,
supra note 21, at 997-99.
46. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 407-08 n.2 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
47. Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) at 529.
48. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603, 625 (1870).
49. See Gerald T. Dunne, Legal Tender Cases, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATEs 498, 498 (Kermit L. Hall ed., 1992).
2017] 1159
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
Act was constitutional." Writing for the majority, Justice Strong
noted that,
[Hepburn] was decided by a divided court, and by a court having less
number of judges than the law then in existence provided this court
shall have. These cases have been heard before a full court, and they
have received our most careful consideration. The questions involved
are constitutional questions of the most vital importance to the gov-
ernment and to the public at large. We have been in the habit of
treating cases involving a consideration of constitutional power dif-
ferently from those which concern merely private right. We are not ac-
customed to hear them in the absence of a full court, if it can be
avoided.5'
But even though the Court argued that constitutional decisions
decided by less than a full bench have less precedential weight
than those decided by a full bench, 2 Justice Strong's opinion does
not seem to support your dichotomy for three reasons. First, Jus-
tice Strong's claim that Hepburn was deserving of less preceden-
tial weight because it was not decided by a full court was unprec-
edented-it moved beyond Briscoe v. Commonwealth's Bank of
Kentucky, which held that it was a prudent "practice" to hear con-
stitutional cases with a full court. 3 In contrast to Briscoe, Justice
Strong's opinion argued that if two conditions are met-(1) a con-
stitutional decision and (2) less than a full Court-the precedent
carries less weight. Justice Strong's additional condition-if the
case is a constitutional decision-and the Court's conclusion-
that the previous case carries less precedential weight-went well
beyond Briscoe.4 Therefore, since Justice Strong's claim was un-
precedented, it provides little support that your dichotomy was
the historical practice of the Court. Second, it appears that Jus-
tice Strong was arguing that, to have less precedential weight, in
addition to the precedent in question being one of constitutional
interpretation, "it must also have been decided by less than a full
Court."" By contrast, you did not couple your two-tiered standard
50. Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) at 553.
51. Id. at 553-54 (emphasis added).
52. Strang and Poole note that the fact that "this was Justice Strong's argument can
also be seen from the other opinions in the case. Justice Bradley, in his concurrence, fo-
cused on the fact that the 'decision is recent, and is only by a bare majority of the court.'"
Strang & Poole, supra note 21, at 999 n.173 (quoting Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12
Wall.) at 570 (Bradley, J., concurring)).
53. 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 118, 122 (1834).
54. Strang & Poole, supra note 21, at 999.
55. Id. (emphasis added).
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with the Briscoe requirement. 6 Instead, it appears that you
claimed that the only condition for application was that the prec-
edent be a constitutional decision.57 Therefore, Justice Strong's
opinion does not seem to support your assertion on that front, ei-
ther. And third, "the Legal Tender Cases were outliers because of
the unique political circumstances under which the Court operat-
ed"-it "was under tremendous pressure from the public and from
Congress to legitimate paper money."58 Thus, the fact that it
buckled to societal and political pressure by reversing Hepburn
hardly qualifies it as strong support for your dichotomy.59 And
while I could continue arguing cases all night, it seems to me that
the Court historically refused to alter its traditional approach to
stare decisis until your dissent in Coronado Oil, which was the
first time that anyone on the Court addressed the issue in a sus-
tained manner."
JUSTICE BRANDEIS: I do not know why you are so concerned with
the historical foundation of this two-tiered standard. But if you
are unconvinced by the record that I used to support my opinion
in Coronado Oil, surely the policy reasons behind adopting such
an approach alone are sufficient to persuade your Justice, are
they not?
MADISON NOMOS: Please elaborate what you mean, Justice
Brandeis. You know your own policy justifications the best, and I
do not want to mischaracterize them.
JUSTICE BRANDEIS: I will gladly summarize why the Court should
follow an approach that gives less precedential weight to consti-
tutional precedent-which, by the way, seems to be what your
Justice wants to do in this case, so I am not sure why you are so
keen in fighting the veracity of my dissent. As I mentioned earlier
in our conversation and in my Coronado Oil dissent, "[t]he Court
bows to the lessons of experience and the force of better reason-
ing, recognizing that the process to trial and error, so fruitful in
the physical sciences, is appropriate also in the judicial func-
tion."" Prior decisions "not only may... have been rendered upon
56. Id.
57. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406-07 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dis-
senting); Strang & Poole, supra note 21, at 999.
58. Strang & Poole, supra note 21, at 999.
59. See id.
60. See id. at 1000.
61. Coronado Oil, 285 U.S. at 407-08 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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an inadequate presentation of then existing conditions, but the
conditions may have changed meanwhile. Moreover, the judg-
ment of the Court in the earlier decision may have been influ-
enced by prevailing views as to economic or social policy which
have since been abandoned."62 "Our Constitution is not a strait-
jacket. It is a living organism. As such it is capable of growth....
Because [it] possesses the capacity of adaptation, it has endured
as the fundamental law of an ever developing people."63 It is pre-
cisely because of the Constitution's adaptability and the popu-
lace's relative inability to amend it that the Court must be able to
reverse prior decisions on the basis of newly obtained knowledge
or societal or scientific developments. The Court must "prefer[]
innovation to the confines of precedent."4
MADISON NOMOS: So, Justice Brandeis, are you suggesting that
stare decisis should be weakened in order to achieve political
ends? Should the Court, in effect, operate as a "floating constitu-
tional convention"?
6 5
JUSTICE BRANDEIS: What I am suggesting is that stare decisis
should be weakened so that the present is not bound by the dead
hand of the past -especially when we know more now than we
did then. Before I took the bench, I championed Progressive caus-
es. I was among "the first lawyers to combine the 'sociological ju-
risprudence' espoused by proto-legal realists in the Progressive
movement-a jurisprudence that rejected the 'rigid formalism' of
the nineteenth century and sought instead to view cases as con-
crete social phenomena-with effective advocacy." 7 In 1911, five
years before I became a Supreme Court Justice, I remarked that
"[i]n the past the courts have reached their conclusions largely
deductively from preconceived notions and precedents. The meth-
od [that I] tried to employ in arguing cases before them has been
62. Id. at 412.
63. MELVIN I. UROFSKY, LouIs D. BRANDEIS: A LIFE 580 (2009) (emphasis added).
64. Strang & Poole, supra note 21, at 984.
65. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 1995), vacated en
banc, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'd and remanded sub nom. Washington v. Glucks-
berg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
66. Cf. Coronado Oil, 285 U.S. at 405-06, 412; (Brandeis, J., dissenting); UROFSKY,
supra note 63, at 320 ("The economic menace of past ages was the dead hand which grad-
ually acquired a large part of all available lands.").
67. Strang & Poole, supra note 21, at 981.
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inductive, reasoning from the facts.""8 And I did just that in my
brief in Muller v. Oregon.69 Before I took the bench,
[L]egal science-the unwritten or judge-made laws as distinguished
from legislation-was largely deaf and blind to [revolutionary
changes]. Courts continued to ignore newly arisen social needs. They
applied complacently eighteenth-century conceptions of the liberty of
the individual and of the sacredness of private property. Early nine-
teenth-century scientific half-truths like '"The survival of the fittest,"
which, translated into practice, meant 'The devil take the hind-
most," were erected by judicial sanction into a moral law. Where
statutes giving expression to the new social spirit were clearly con-
stitutional, judges, imbued with the relentless spirit of individual-
ism, often construed them away. Where any doubt as to the constitu-
tionality of such statutes could find lodgment, courts all too
frequently declared the acts void.70
In matters of great importance that have the potential to affect
the rights of the entire populace,"' what just society would allow
and encourage the present to be inexorably bound to such deci-
sions of the past? And so, when I ultimately joined the Court in
1916, I "continued to be a stalwart advocate of Progressive policy
goals. 72 Others have noted my "intense activity as [a] new Deal
recruiting officer" and my "persistent, behind-the-scenes effort[s
in the Court] ... to implement the policies [I] believed essential to
economic recovery and political reform., 73 For example, it is well
known that I generally refrained from dissenting except when
necessary while I was on the Court.74 "There is a limit to the fre-
quency with which you can [dissent], without exasperating
men."75 So, "I sometimes endorse[d] an opinion with which I d[id]
not agree, 'I acquiesce[d]'; as Holmes putf it 'I'[d] shut up."'76 But
68. PHILIPPA STRUM, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS: JUSTICE FOR THE PEOPLE 124-25 (1984).
69. 208 U.S. 412 (1908). 'In a bold move, Brandeis included only two pages of legal
argument in his brief, and then appended over 110 pages presenting social science data
regarding the effects of long hours of labor on the 'health, safety, and morals and general
welfare of women." Strang & Poole, supra note 21, at 981-82 (citing John W. Johnson,
Brandeis Brief, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES 85, 85 (Kermit L. Hall ed., 1992)).
70. Louis D. Brandeis, "The Living Law," in BRANDEIS ON DEMOCRACY 59, 60-62
(Philippa Strum ed., 1995).
71. See supra note 8.
72. Strang & Poole, supra note 21, at 982.
73. Nelson Lloyd Dawson, Brandeis and the New Deal, in BRANDEIS AND AMERICA 38,
40 (Nelson Lloyd Dawson ed., 1989) (citations omitted).
74. UROFSKY, supra note 63, at 579.
75. Id. (alteration in original).
76. Id.
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in cases-such as Coronado Oil-where the idea of a 'living Con-
stitution" really mattered, I dissented from my "brother Justices"
over and over again because their opinions relied too heavily on
precedent at the expense of consequences or facts.77
JUSTICE SCALIA [jovially]: I dissent!"
JUSTICE BRANDEIS [laughing]: I had a feeling that you might.
JUSTICE SCALIA: To start, the Constitution is "not a living docu-
ment. It's dead, dead, dead."7 Or, better put, it is "enduring."8
JUSTICE BRANDEIS: That seems a bit harsh ....
JUSTICE SCALIA [joking]: Justice Brandeis, if you are a revolu-
tionary in your approach to the Constitution, I can only hope to
be described as a "counterrevolutionary."" Listen, "I attack ideas.
I don't attack people. And some very good people"-present com-
pany included-"have some very bad ideas. 82
JUSTICE BRANDEIS [laughing]: Well, I suppose that I will accept
the complement.
JUSTICE SCALIA: Back to the topic at hand. As I mentioned earli-
er, I agree with you, Justice Brandeis, that "the doctrine of stare
decisis is less rigid in its application to constitutional prece-
dents."83 But I think that you [looking at Madison Nomos] are get-
ting too caught up in whether he was correct in his assertion that
it was the historical practice of the Court. Regardless of whether
the "Brandeis dichotomy" found its roots in the nineteenth centu-
ry, it has become an engrained practice of the Court. It is not re-
77. See Philippa Strum, Brandeis and the Living Constitution, in BRANDEIS AND
AMERICA 118, 118-32 (Nelson Lloyd Dawson ed., 1989) (proposing that Brandeis's view of
human nature, his view of law, and his closely allied view of constitutional interpretation
shaped his perspective of the Constitution as a "living" document).
78. The lack of the traditional qualifier, "respectfully," is not meant to imply any lack
of collegiality or respect that would exist between Justice Scalia and Justice Brandeis. See
King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2507 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("I dissent.").
79. Katie Glueck, Scalia: The Constitution Is 'Dead,' POLITICO (Jan. 29, 2013, 8:26
AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2013/01/scalia-the-constitution-is-dead-086853 (re-
counting Justice Scalia's statement while speaking at Southern Methodist University).
80. Lesley Stahl, Justice Scalia on the Record, CBS NEWS (Apr. 24, 2008), http://www.
cbsnews.com/news/justice-scalia-on-the-record/.
81. Id.
82. Id. ("I can be charming and combative at the same time.... What's contradictory
between the two? I love to argue. I've always loved to argue. And I love to point out the
weaknesses of the opposing arguments. It may well be that I'm something of a shin kicker.
It may well be that I'm something of a contrarian.").
83. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 965 (1991).
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lied upon for its "precedential value"-it is neither statutorily nor
constitutionally mandated-rather, it is relied upon as a matter
of convenience. Moreover, it is good practice for the Court to
adopt such a policy, but not for the reasons stated by my col-
league.
MADISON NOMOS: Well, Justice Scalia, why do you believe the
Court should give less deference to constitutional precedent?
JUSTICE SCALIA: It all comes down to how one views the proper
role of a Justice on the Supreme Court. As I see it, "[i]f you're go-
ing to be a good and faithful judge, you have to resign yourself to
the fact that you're not always going to like the conclusions you
reach. If you like them all the time, you're probably doing some-
thing wrong."8
[T]he main danger in judicial interpretation of the Constitu-
tion... is that judges will mistake their own predilections for the
law. Avoiding this error is the hardest part of being a conscientious
judge.... Nonoriginalism, which under one or another formulation
invokes 'fundamental values' as the touchstone of constitutionality,
plays precisely to this weakness.8
5
In other words, "[t]he judge who always likes the results he
reaches is a bad judge."86 And so, if a collection of five unelected
judges erred in a matter of constitutional interpretation, the
Court should not be inescapably bound to continue the folly.
"[Stare decisis], to the extent it rests upon anything more than
administrative convenience, is merely the application to judicial
precedents of a more general principle that the settled practices
and expectations of a democratic society should generally not be
disturbed by the courts."87 In fact, "[e]very time the Supreme
Court defines another right in the Constitution it reduces the
scope of democratic debate."88 And so, "[a] decision of this Court
which, not overruling a prior holding, nonetheless announces a
novel rule, contrary to long and unchallenged practice, and pro-
nounces it to be the Law of the Land-such a decision, no less
84. Antonin Scalia, Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, ACE'S WEB WORLD,
http://www.edu.aceswebworld.comJantoninscalia.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2017) [herein-
after Antonin Scalia, Associate Justice].
85. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 849, 863 (1989).
86. Glueck, supra note 79.
87. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 834-35 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
88. Antonin Scalia, Associate Justice, supra note 84.
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than an explicit overruling, should be approached with great cau-
tion." 9
MADISON NOMOS: So, then, Justice Scalia, would I be correct in
stating that you only ignored the doctrine of stare decisis when
the Court's previous holdings had no foundation in constitutional
text or American legal or social traditions? In other words, you
"sought to deactivate the Court's previous activism?"9
JUSTICE SCALIA: Sure.
JUSTICE BRANDEIS: You see, while I would move society forward
by discounting constitutional precedent that no longer found its
basis in reason, my colleague would "turn back the clock" on
many basic civil rights, including the privacy protections and
much of the Bill of Rights law that developed in the latter half of
the 20th century.91 As a fellow "Living Constitutionalist" argued:
"[I]t should be clear that an extraordinarily radical purge of es-
tablished constitutional doctrine would be required if we candidly
and consistently applied" Justice Scalia's originalism.92 "Surely
that makes out at least a prima facie practical case against the
model."93
MADISON NOMOS: Yes, Justice Scalia, would it not be judicial ac-
tivism-which you claim to loathe-to reverse years of precedent
and societal progress because you think that a case from thirty
years ago was decided incorrectly? Moreover, would you not be
bound by your own views to reject all nonoriginalist precedent?
Of course, I know that you were not consistent in doing so during
your tenure.
JUSTICE SCALIA [sarcastically]: And how exactly I was incon-
sistent?
MADISON NOMOS: Well, Justice Scalia, it appears to me that the
cases in which you confront the issue of whether to adhere to the
doctrine of stare decisis can be placed into three separate catego-
ries. The first of these is when you have argued that the Court
89. Payne, 501 U.S. at 835 (Scalia, J., concurring).
90. SCALIA'S COURT: A LEGACY OF LANDMARK OPINIONS AND DISSENTS 15-16 (Kevin
A. Ring ed., 2016).
91. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF
LEGAL TEXTS 411 (2012).
92. Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, in STANFORD LEGAL




should disregard stare decisis in order to overrule nonoriginalist
precedent. Though there are countless opinions from your years
on the bench that fit in this category, I think that your dissent in
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey94 is,
perhaps, the clearest example."5 As you know, in Casey, the Court
was asked to determine the constitutionality of five provisions of
the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982.96 While upholding
four of the five provisions, the plurality reaffirmed "the essential
holding of Roe v. Wade" in large part due to its consideration of
"principles of institutional integrity ... and the rule of stare deci-
sis."97 Relying on the notion that "the very concept of the rule of
law underlying our own Constitution requires such continuity
over time that a respect for precedent is, by definition, indispen-
sable,"9 the plurality determined that the key questions it had to
answer when ascertaining the applicability of the doctrine of
stare decisis were whether "the rule has proven to be intolerable
simply in defying practical workability; whether the rule is sub-
ject to a kind of reliance that would lend special hardship to the
consequences of overruling and add inequity to the cost of repudi-
ation; whether related principles of law have so far developed as
94. 505 U.S. 833, 979 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
95. Id.; see also Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 351, 354 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(arguing that the Court should overrule New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981), and
Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615 (2004), because "the historical practices the
Framers sought to preserve" by ratifying the Fourth Amendment do not justify the rule set
forth in those cases, which "opens the field to what I think are plainly unconstitutional
searches"); Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 625, 628-29 (2004) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring in the judgment) (urging the Court to overrule New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454
(1981), because "in our search for clarity, we have now abandoned our constitutional moor-
ings and floated to a place where the law approves of purely exploratory searches of vehi-
cles during which officers with no definite objective or reason for the search are allowed to
rummage around in a car to see what they might find") (alteration in original) (emphasis
added) (quoting United States v. McLaughlin, 170 F.3d 889, 894 (9th Cir. 1999) (Trott, J.,
concurring)); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42, 60 (2004) (tracing the common law
roots of the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause while arguing that Ohio v. Roberts,
448 U.S. 56 (1980), should be overruled because it "departs from the historical principles"
of the "original meaning of the Confrontation Clause").
96. Casey, 505 U.S. at 844 (plurality opinion). The provisions at issue: (1) required a
woman seeking an abortion to give her informed consent after having been provided with
certain information at least twenty-four hours before the abortion was performed; (2)
mandated the consent of one parent for a minor seeking an abortion (with a "judicial by-
pass option if the minor does not wish to or cannot obtain a parent's consent"); (3) required
a married woman to obtain the written approval of her husband before seeking an abor-
tion; (4) imposed certain reporting requirements on facilities that provide abortions; and
(5) set forth a definition of "medical emergency" that would alleviate the need to comply
with the other requirements. Id.
97. Id. at 845-46 (emphasis added).
98. Id. at 854.
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to have left the old rule no more than a remnant of abandoned
doctrine; or," citing your dissent in Coronado Oil, Justice Brande-
is, "whether the facts have so changed, or come to be seen so dif-
ferently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant application
or justification."99 After an extensive analysis, the plurality con-
cluded that "[w]ithin the bounds of normal stare decisis analy-
sis.., the stronger argument is for affirming Roe's central hold-
ing.''1°  Justice Scalia, in a somewhat caustic dissent, you
challenged the plurality's reliance on what it perceived to be Roe
v. Wade's "central holding"-that "the power of a woman to abort
her unborn child is a 'liberty' in the absolute sense" -because of
that decision's nonoriginalist foundations. 1 Consequently, you
took issue with the plurality's conclusion that it must be followed
because of the importance of stare decisis."' Despite the plurali-
ty's "exhaustive discussion of all the factors that go into the de-
termination of when stare decisis should be observed and when
disregarded," you noted that "they never mention[ed]" the im-
portant question of 'how wrong was the [initial] decision on its
face?"'0 3 Thus, you asserted that "[t]he Court's reliance upon stare
decisis can best be described as contrived. It insists upon the ne-
cessity of adhering not to all of Roe, but only to what it calls the
'central holding."" 4 You argued that "stare decisis ought to be ap-
plied even to the doctrine of stare decisis," which did not include
the "keep-what-you-want-and-throw-away-the-rest version" em-
ployed by the Court.' In conclusion, you argued that, instead of
picking and choosing the parts of past decisions that they liked,
"the Justices should do what is legally right by asking two ques-
tions: (1) Was Roe correctly decided? (2) Has Roe succeeded in
producing a settled body of law? If the answer to both questions
[was] no," as you concluded it was in this case, stare decisis
should be disregarded and "Roe should undoubtedly be over-
ruled.'0 6
99. Id. at 854-55.
100. Id. at 861 (emphasis added).
101. Id. at 980 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 982-83.
103. Id. (emphasis added).
104. Id. at 993.
105. Id. ("I wonder whether, as applied to Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803),
for example, the new version of stare decisis would be satisfied if we allowed courts to re-
view the constitutionality of only those statutes that (like the one in Marbury) pertain to
the jurisdiction of the courts.").
106. Id. at 999.
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JUSTICE BRANDEIS [laughing]: And now it is my turn to dissent. 7
Nothing changed, factually, in the nineteen years between Roe
and Casey. And, though the issue was divisive amongst the popu-
lace both then and now, this was certainly a situation in which it
was "more important that the applicable rule of law be settled
than that it be settled right,"'' 8 which it appears to have been in
the first instance. And so, the plurality was right in its reliance
upon Roe. My two-tiered analysis, after all, was not meant to give
Justices carte blanche to overrule constitutional precedent on a
whim.
JUSTICE SCALIA: Well, it was as clear then as it is now that "[t]he
Imperial Judiciary lives.""' 9 Nonetheless [turning to Madison No-
mos], it seems that I am batting 1.000110 against your claims of in-
consistency ....
MADISON NOMOS: Yes, Justice Scalia, the first category certainly
stands in your favor. But please allow me to continue-and I will
attempt to be brief to make my point. The second category con-
sists of those cases in which you dissented because the Court
failed to follow originalist precedent, with the best example being
your dissenting opinion in Lawrence v. Texas."' As you are both
aware, in Lawrence, the Court, relying in part on Casey, held that
criminal statutes outlawing sodomy were unconstitutional be-
cause they violated individuals' fundamental "liberty" to engage
in sexual acts within the privacy of their own homes."2 In doing
so, the majority appeared to take a page from your dissent in Ca-
107. See supra note 78.
108. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing).
109. Casey, 505 U.S. at 996 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In Casey, Justice Scalia further not-
ed, "I cannot agree with, indeed I am appalled by, the Court's suggestion that the decision
whether to stand by an erroneous constitutional decision must be strongly influenced-
against overruling, no less-by the substantial and continuing public opposition the deci-
sion has generated." Id. at 998.
110. See Jonas Shaffer, Justice Antonin Scalia Was a Camden Yards Regular, Often to
Root on the Yankees, BALT. SUN (Feb. 15, 2016, 5:45 PM), http://www.baltimoresun.com
sports/bal-justice-antonin-scalia-was-a-camden-yards-regular-often-to-root-on-the-yankees
-20160215-story.html; see also Roger Rubin, Supreme Court Justice Sonia Sotomayor
Joins Yankee Stadium Bleacher Creatures During First-Inning Wednesday, N.Y. DAILY
NEWS (Aug. 1, 2012, 10:33 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/sportsbaseballyankees/sup
reme-court-justice-sonia-sotomayor-joins-yankee-stadium-bleacher-creatures-first-inning-
wednesday-article-1.1126783 ("Justice (Antonin) Scalia is fond of reminding me that he
was the first Yankees fan on the Court and he is still a very loyal Yankees fan.").
111. 539 U.S. 558, 586-87 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 578 (majority opinion).
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sey when it overruled Bowers v. Hardwick"' because of the Jus-
tices' belief that it "was not correct when it was decided" and it
"ought not to remain binding precedent.""' 4 Because societal views
of homosexuality had changed in the years since Bowers was de-
cided, the Court found that the decision was no longer binding.1 r5
In your dissent, Justice Scalia, you began by sharply noting that
you did "not [yourself] believe in rigid adherence to stare decisis
in constitutional cases; but [you] do believe that [the Court]
should be consistent rather than manipulative in invoking the
doctrine.""' 6 You argued that the Court was flippant in its appeal
to stare decisis by comparing Roe with Bowers"7 and by demon-
strating that Bowers was decided based on an originalist inter-
pretation of the Fourteenth Amendment."8 The Court, in your
opinion, had "largely signed on to the so-called homosexual agen-
da" and thus was willing to take advantage of Justice Brandeis's
standard that constitutional precedents carry less precedential
weight in order to eliminate "the moral opprobrium that has tra-
ditionally attached to homosexual conduct.""' 9
JUSTICE BRANDEIS: I apologize for interrupting, but it appears
from the cases you have cited thus far that my colleague has been
remarkably consistent in his approach to stare decisis-
misguided, though he may be. He argues for overruling cases that
did not adhere to his jurisprudential views while affirming those
that do. Obviously my "brother Justice" can defend himself, but
what exactly is the point that you trying to make by breaking
these decisions down into arbitrary categories?
MADISON NOMOS: I was attempting to draw attention to the first
two categories of Justice Scalia's treatment of stare decisis in or-
der to show their stark contrast with the third: those cases where
you [looking at Justice Scalia] seem to accept precedent, even
where it is inconsistent with the original meaning of the text. In
your 1988 Taft Lecture, entitled Originalism: The Lesser Evil, you
described yourself as a "faint-hearted originalist" who would af-
113. 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (holding that the Constitution did not confer a funda-
mental right to engage in homosexual sodomy).
114. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
115. Id. at 571-77.
116. Id. at 587 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
117. Id. at 587-92.
118. Id. at 592-98. "The Court's description of 'the state of the law' at the time of Bow-
ers only confirms that Bowers was right." Id. at 594 (citing id. at 518 (majority opinion)).
119. Id. at 602.
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firm a strong role for nonoriginalist precedent12 because the "re-
sults of doing otherwise seem ... too objectionable to counte-
nance."12' Professor Randy Barnett has alleged that, in your ap-
proach, you are "willing to avoid objectionable outcomes that
would result from originalism by invoking the precedents estab-
lished by the dead hand of nonoriginalist justices.' 22 A key exam-
ple of this apparent inconsistency centers on your treatment of
substantive due process.12 For example, in your concurring opin-
ion in Albright v. Oliver, you noted your acceptance of the Court's
inclusions of "certain explicit substantive protections of the Bill of
Rights" within the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause
"because it is both long established and narrowly limited," despite
that doctrine's blatant departure from the Clause's original
meaning.1 24 And in McDonald v. City of Chicago, you reaffirmed
that position, "[d]espite [your] misgivings about substantive due
process as an original matter,'21 instead of joining Justice Thom-
as's concurring opinion where he argued for the rejection of sub-
stantive due process and the resurgence of the Fourteenth
Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause. 6 So, more fully
stated, my question is how can you [looking at Justice Scalia] ar-
gue for a weaker view of stare decisis in nonoriginalist constitu-
tional interpretation in some cases, but not in others? For the sa-
ke of consistency, are you not bound as an adherent and
proponent of originalism to purge established constitutional doc-
trine based on nonoriginalist interpretation? Is judicial engage-
ment in this context not the truest form of judicial restraint?
JUSTICE SCALIA [chuckling]: "Get out of here!"'2 7 First and fore-
most, while I described myself as fainthearted in 1988, I repudi-
120. See Scalia, supra note 85, at 864.
121. Randy E. Barnett, Scalia's Infidelity: A Critique of 'Taint-Hearted" Originalism,
75 U. CIN. L. REV. 7, 12 (2006). Much of this portion of the conversation borrows from Pro-
fessor Barnett's critique.
122. Id. at 13.
123. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 550, 559-61 (1995) (joining Chief
Justice Rehnquist's opinion of the Court, which attempted to reconcile its result with the
Court's post-New Deal interpretation of the Commerce Clause, instead of joining Justice
Thomas's concurring opinion, which included a stricter originalist analysis).
124. 510 U.S. 266, 275 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring).
125. 561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring).
126. See generally id. at 805-06 (Thomas, J., concurring).
127. Christopher Landau, Tribute: He Did What He Was Born to Do, SCOTUSBLOG
(Feb. 25, 2016, 3:32 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/02/tribute-he-did-what-he-was-
born-to-do/ ('The expression.., was perhaps the Justice's favorite way of dismissing an
argument he deemed meritless.").
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ated that sentiment a long time ago -"I try to be an honest
originalist!' 12' And second, none of the cases that you have cited
support your assertion that I have been inconsistent in that view
in my approach to the doctrine of stare decisis. Listen, while I
admit to not believing "in rigid adherence to stare decisis in con-
stitutional cases,' ' 130 "I'm an originalist and a textualist, not a
nut."'131 Therefore, I "do not propose that all decisions made, and
doctrines adopted, in the past half-century or so of unrestrained
constitutional improvisation be set aside.' 32 Rather, I have ar-
gued that "only those [cases] that fail to meet the criteria for
stare decisis" should be overturned.'33 These criteria include con-
sideration of (1) "whether harm will be caused to those who justi-
fiably relied on the decision,' 34 (2) "how clear it is that the deci
sion was textually and historically wrong,' 135 (3) "whether the
128. MARCIA COYLE, THE ROBERTS COURT: THE STRUGGLE FOR THE CONSTITUTION 164-
65 (2013).
129. Jennifer Senoir, In Conversation: Antonin Scalia, N.Y. MAG. (Oct. 6, 2013), http:
//nymag.com/news/features/antonin-scalia-2013-10/.
130. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 587 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
131. Nina Totenberg, Justice Scalia, the Great Dissenter, Opens Up, NPR (Apr. 28,
2008, 7:32 AM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=89986017 (refer-
ring to Justice Thomas's hardline approach to nonoriginalist precedent).
132. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 91, at 412.
133. Id. The proceeding discussion is adapted from SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 91, at
412.
134. Id. (citing Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 673 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment) (explaining that stare decisis has little applicability
when the earlier caselaw has spawned uncertainty because the doctrine's purpose is that
"of introducing certainty and stability into the law and protecting the expectations of indi-
viduals and institutions that have acted in reliance on existing rules"); South Carolina v.
Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 824 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ('The freshness of error not only
deprives [the earlier case] of the respect to which long-established practice is entitled, but
also counsels that the opportunity of correction be seized at once, before state and federal
laws and practices have been adjusted to embody it."); THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON
THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE
STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 52 (1868) ("Before [disregarding stare decisis],... it will
be well to consider whether the point involved is such as to have become a rule of property,
so that titles have been acquired in reliance upon it, and vested rights will be disturbed by
any change.")).
135. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 91, at 412 (citing Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808,
834 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (supporting the overruling of Booth v. Maryland, 482
U.S. 496 (1987): 'If there was ever a case that defied reason, it was Booth... , imposing a
constitutional rule that had absolutely no basis in constitutional text, in historical prac-
tice, or in logic."); United States v. International Boxing Club of N.Y., Inc., 348 U.S. 236,
249 (1955) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ('That doctrine [of stare decisis] is not, to be sure,
an imprisonment of reason.")). While, on the surface, Justice Scalia appears to be adopting
an approach similar to that espoused by Caleb Nelson in Stare Decisis and Demonstrably
Erroneous Precedents, 87 VA. L. REV. 1 (2001), it is notable that this is not his only criteria
as what constitutes "demonstrably erroneous precedent" is in the eye of the beholder.
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decision has been generally accepted by society,"'36 and (4)
"whether the decision permanently places courts in the position of
making policy calls appropriate for elected officials.' 37 So, while I
"believe that the Supreme Court should not give stare decisis ef-
fect to Roe v. Wade,"''  I "would, on the other hand, accept as set-
tled law the incorporation doctrine-whereby the Bill of Rights is
made applicable to the states by interpreting the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause as encompassing it-even
though it is based on an interpretation of the Due Process Clause
(so-called substantive due process) that the words will not
bear."'39 And so, in response to your specific challenge, I "would
accept most, though not all, other prior applications of substan-
tive due process, though [I] would not apply that atextual doc-
trine anew in the future."'40 Thus, stare decisis-a doctrine whose
function "is to make us say that what is false under proper analy-
sis must nonetheless be held to be true, all in the interest of sta-
bility" 4 '-"is an exception to textualism (as it is to any theory of
interpretation) born not of logic but of necessity."'' So while you
may be able to organize my opinions into seemingly clear, but
nonetheless arbitrary, categories regarding their treatment of
nonoriginalist precedent, you have missed the forest for the trees;
they are consistent based on the Court's past treatment of stare
decisis.
JUSTICE BRANDEIS: Well, Justice Scalia, it appears that we are
more alike in our views of the subject than I originally thought.
Are our approaches to stare decisis not the same, albeit under a
136. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 91, at 412 (citing John 0. McGinnis & Michael B.
Rappaport, A Pragmatic Defense of Originalism, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 917, 922
(2008) (noting that the Constitution containing entrenched norms with substantial con-
sensus, "creates legitimacy, allegiance, and even affection as citizens come to regard the
entrenched norms as part of their common bond")).
137. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 91, at 412 (citing Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509,
556 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (declining to give stare decisis effect to "congruence and
proportionality" tests for § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment)); Ewing v. California, 538
U.S. 11, 31-32 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring) (declining to give stare decisis effect to a
"proportionality" test for violation of the Eighth Amendment)); Stenberg v. Carhart, 530
U.S. 914, 954-56 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (declining to give stare decisis effect to the
"undue burden" standard of Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833 (1992) (plurality opinion)).
138. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 91, at 413.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW
138-40 (1997).
142. ScALIA & GARNER, supra note 91, at 414.
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different name? After all, we have both adopted a relatively weak
view of constitutional precedent so that we may be free to urge
the Court to later correct itself from the dead hand control of the
past ....
JUSTICE SCALIA: Brother Louis,143 though you are correct that we
both argue for weak adherence to constitutional precedent, the
purposes behind our approaches could not be more different.
While you and those who agree with you seek to free the Court
from its past decisions so that it may evolve with what you per-
ceive to be the current society's revised beliefs-based on advanc-
es in science or social milieus- I am arguing that Justices should
reverse the decisions of Living Constitutionalists so that the
democratic process and the rule of law may be respected and
reign supreme, instead of the Court.
JUSTICE BRANDEIS: Justice Scalia, we can both agree that "[i]f we
desire respect for the law, we must first make the law respecta-
ble.""14 It seems that we just disagree on how to effectuate that.
MADISON NOMOS [looking at his watch]: Well, Justice Brandeis
and Justice Scalia, this conversation has been illuminating. I am
now convinced that your [looking at Justice Brandeis] chief asser-
tion that the doctrine of stare decisis bears less weight when it
involves constitutional precedent is the historical practice of the
Court, regardless of whether it was at the time of Coronado Oil.
And so, when starting with that general precept, it seems that
what is to be done from that point forward depends on my Jus-
tice's view of her proper function as a Supreme Court Justice in-
terpreting the Constitution-whether she wants the Court to
evolve or to devolve. You have given me much to consider.
JUSTICE BRANDEIS [standing up]: Thank you for the entertain-
ment. We will leave you to finish your draft-best not to upset
your Justice.
JUSTICE SCALIA [standing up and retrieving the Dictionary from
the reading table]: Yes, we better be off. Don't make a regular
habit of staying here all night.' Assuming you have kids, "[b]e
143. Justice Clarence Thomas, Eulogy at Justice Scalia's Memorial Service (Mar. 1,
2016), https://www.c-span.org/video/?405460-1/memorial-service-supreme-court-justice-ant
onin-scalia (referring to Justice Scalia's practice during oral argument to lean back in his
chair and ask "Brother Clarence" for his thoughts).
144. A TREASURY OF JEWISH QUOTATIONS 269 (Joseph L. Baron ed., 1996).
145. See Mark Zimmermann, Cardinal, Chaplain Praise Scalia as Man of Faith, Fami-
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home for dinner. Be home for dinner. That is when the little mon-
sters are civilized. They do not grow up civilized. It is a process.
And much of that process occurs at family dinner."'46
JUSTICE BRANDEIS: Yes, "[w]hen a man feels that he cannot leave
his work, it is a sure sign of an impending collapse." '147
MADISON NOMOS: I do not anticipate making a regular habit of
interrupting your nightly arguments. Given the significance of
this decision to the American people and to my Justice, however,
I feel compelled to stay here until I complete this draft. I am
learning that there is more to judging than just calling balls and
strikes. 48 While judges certainly should be umpires and not play-
ers, the strike zone provides a definitive guide for how they are to
make the call. There is no grey line. That is rarely the case in the
Supreme Court.
JUSTICE SCALIA [laughing]: Of course there is a strike zone on the
Court: the Constitution. As my successor, Justice Gorsuch, so elo-
quently put it, "donning a black robe means something-and not
just that I can hide the coffee stains on my shirts. We wear
robes-honest, unadorned, black polyester robes that we (yes) are
expected to buy for ourselves at the local uniform supply store-
as a reminder of what's expected of us when we go about our
business: what Burke called the 'cold neutrality of an impartial
judge.",4 9 The "controversial" cases are much simpler than you
think they are. "The death penalty? Give me a break. It's easy.
ly and the Law, CATHOLIC NEWS SERV. (Feb. 18, 2016, 4:51 PM), http://www.catholicnews.
com/services/englishnews/2016/cardinal-chaplain-praise-scalia-as-man-of-faith-family-and-
the-law.cfm.
146. Justice Antonin Scalia, Address at Pepperdine University School of Law (Feb. 16,
2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v-zPNxqr_5-gY.
147. Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Alfred Brandeis (Mar. 8, 1897), in 3 LETTERS OF
LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, 1913-1915, 127 (Melvin I. Urofsky & David W. Levy eds., 1971).
148. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief Jus-
tice of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55-56
(2005) ("Judges are like umpires. Umpires don't make the rules, they apply them. The role
of an umpire and a judge is critical. They make sure everybody plays by the rules, but it is
a limited role. Nobody ever went to a ball game to see the umpire.... If I am confirmed, I
will confront every case with an open mind. I will fully and fairly analyze the legal argu-
ments that are presented. I will be open to the considered views of my colleagues on the
bench, and I will decide every case based on the record, according to the rule of law, with-
out fear or favor, to the best of my ability, and I will remember that it's my job to call balls
and strikes, and not to pitch or bat.").
149. Neil M. Gorsuch, Of Lions and Bears, Judges and Legislators, and the Legacy of
Justice Scalia, 66 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 905, 919-20 (2016) (quoting Edmund Burke, Pref-
ace to the Address of M. Brissot to His Constituents, in 8 THE WORKS OF THE RIGHT
HONOURABLE EDMUND BURKE 381, 381 (London, F. & C. Rivington 1801)).
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Abortion? Absolutely easy. Nobody ever thought the Constitution
prevented restrictions on abortion. Homosexual sodomy? Come
on. For 200 years, it was criminal in every state.""'
JUSTICE BRANDEIS: No, that is not right. What was perceived as a
constitutional practice in the past may no longer be so today. And
similarly, what was never viewed as a constitutionally protected
right in 1791 may become one as the country's moral compass
changes. The Court's members must leave their old methodolo-
gies behind in favor of the new as they become a more informed
body.
JUSTICE SCALIA: While the traditional, originalist view of judging
may not always "yield a single right answer in all hard cases,"
that does not mean that courts should or must abandon it. 5 ' "Im-
agine two men walking in the woods who happen upon an angry
bear. They start running for their lives. But the bear is quickly
gaining on them. One man yells to the other, 'We'll never be able
to outrun this bear!' The other replies calmly, 'I don't have to out-
run the bear, I just have to outrun you." ' 152 I just don't think that
you [turning to Justice Brandeis] are offering anything better
with your proposed evolving-Constitution approach. In our demo-
cratic republic, the people have the ultimate power, not five une-
lected judges who are tasked with examining society's social
thermometer. So, Brother Louis, I will leave you and your method
to the bear.
MADISON NOMOS: I do not want to speak out of turn on a topic of
which I know little, but perhaps I can try to meet in the middle. I
agree that judges in a democratic society are not legislators and
should not seek "to reshape the law as they think it should be in
the future."' 3 Instead, judges should "strive (if humanly and so
imperfectly) to apply the law as it is, focusing backward, not for-
ward, and looking to text, structure, and history to decide what a
reasonable reader at the time of the events in question would
have understood the law to be-not to decide cases based on their
own moral convictions or the policy consequences they believe
150. Scalia: Abortion, Death Penalty "Easy" Cases, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Oct. 5, 2012,
4:14 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/scalia-abortion-death-penalty-easy-cases/.
151. Gorsuch, supra note 149, at 918.
152. Id. (noting that Justice Scalia loved to tell this story).
153. Id. at 906.
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might service society best.""1 4 Though the judiciary is bound by
the laws passed by the people through legislation and ratified by
the Executive, however, the Court must also be sure to give due
consideration and respect to the specific facts involved in the un-
derlying case. While we work in the law every day, for many peo-
ple who come before this Court or any other, it is the only interac-
tion with the justice system that they will ever have. "Everyone
who comes to Court deserves respect .... A case isn't just a num-
ber or a name, but a life's story and a human being with equal
dignity to [our] own.""15 I think that judges owe it to those people
to approach the facts of each case as neutrally as possible, but
perhaps not "cold[ly]."1" And so, it appears to me that judging is
much more akin to the infield fly rule6 7 than it is to calling balls
and strikes. There is an established rule for how to make the call,
but ultimately it is the instinct of the judge that wins the day.
This allows for a bit of subjectivity to creep in, no matter how
hard the judge tries to suppress it. Regardless, it seems both of
you agree that the Court should adopt a weak view of stare deci-
sis, which answers my Justice's question. Thank you both again
for your advice tonight. It has been an honor. You are both truly
154. Id.
155. Confirmation Hearings on the Nomination of Neil Gorsuch to Be Associate Justice
of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. - (2017).
156. Burke, supra note 149, at 155.
157. MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL, OFFICIAL BASEBALL RULES 145-46 (2016), http://mlb.
mlb.com/mlb/downloads/y20l6/official-baseball_rules.pdf ("An INFIELD FLY is a fair fly
ball (not including a line drive nor an attempted bunt) which can be caught by an infielder
with ordinary effort, when first and second, or first, second and third bases are occupied,
before two are out. The pitcher, catcher and any outfielder who stations himself in the in-
field on the play shall be considered infielders for the purpose of this rule. When it seems
apparent that a batted ball will be an Infield Fly, the umpire shall immediately declare
'Infield Fly' for the benefit of the runners. If the ball is near the baselines, the umpire
shall declare 'Infield Fly, if Fair.' The ball is alive and runners may advance at the risk of
the ball being caught, or retouch and advance after the ball is touched, the same as on any
fly ball. If the hit becomes a foul ball, it is treated the same as any foul. If a declared In-
field Fly is allowed to fall untouched to the ground, and bounces foul before passing first or
third base, it is a foul ball. If a declared Infield Fly falls untouched to the ground outside
the baseline, and bounces fair before passing first or third base, it is an Infield Fly."); id. at
146 ("On the infield fly rule the umpire is to rule whether the ball could ordinarily have
been handled by an infielder-not by some arbitrary limitation such as the grass, or the
base lines. The umpire must rule also that a ball is an infield fly, even if handled by an
outfielder, if, in the umpire's judgment, the ball could have been as easily handled by an
infielder. The infield fly is in no sense to be considered an appeal play. The umpire's judg-
ment must govern, and the decision should be made immediately."); id. at 39-40 ("A batter
is out when... [a]n Infield Fly is declared'). For an excellent discussion of the Infield Fly
Rule, see Aside: The Common Law Origins of the Infield Fly Rule, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1474
(1975).
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lions of the law. 158
JUSTICE SCALIA: At the end of the day just remember to make the
decision and move on. And as for the American people, [laughing]
they will "get over it.""'5 Now, where were we, Justice Brandeis?
Ah, yes [muffled whispering] ....
Justice Brandeis and Justice Scalia exit through the same door in
which they entered, continuing their argument over Webster's New
International Dictionary: Second Edition (1934). Meanwhile,
Madison Nomos returns to his work with renewed fervor.
158. See Gorsuch, supra note 149, at 905 ("Justice Scalia. He really was a lion of the
law: docile in private life but a ferocious fighter when at work, with a roar that could echo
for miles.'.
159. Stahl, supra note 80 (discussing the backlash in response to the Supreme Court's
decision in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000)).
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